Competitive equilibrium with equal incomes (CEEI) is a well-known fair allocation mechanism [Foley 1967; Varian 1974; Thomson and Varian 1985]; however, for indivisible resources a CEEI may not exist. It was shown in Budish [2011] that in the case of indivisible resources there is always an allocation, called A-CEEI, that is approximately fair, approximately truthful, and approximately efficient, for some favorable approximation parameters. This approximation is used in practice to assign business school students to classes. In this paper we show that finding the A-CEEI allocation guaranteed to exist by Budish's theorem is PPAD-complete. We further show that finding an approximate equilibrium with better approximation guarantees is even harder: NP-complete.
INTRODUCTION
University classes have limited capacity, and some are more popular than others. This creates an interesting allocation problem. Imagine that each student has ordered all possible bundles of courses from most desirable to least desirable, and the capacities of classes are known. What is the best way to allocate class seats to students? There are several desiderata for a course allocation mechanism:
Fairness. In what sense is the mechanism "fair"? Efficiency. Are all possible seats in courses allocated? Feasibility. Are any classes oversubscribed? Truthfulness. Are students motivated to honestly report their preferences to the mechanism? Computational efficiency. Can the allocation be computed from the data in polynomial time?
Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (CEEI) [Foley 1967; Varian 1974; Thomson and Varian 1985] is a venerable mechanism with many attractive properties: In CEEI all agents are allocated the same amount of "funny money", next they declare their preferences, and then a price equilibrium is found that clears the market. The market clearing guarantees efficiency and feasibility. The mechanism has a strong, albeit technical, ex post fairness guarantee that emerges from the notion that agents who miss out on a valuable, competitive item will have extra funny money to spend on other items at equilibrium. Truthfulness is problematic -as usual with market mechanisms -even though the problem is mitigated by the large number of agents. However, CEEI works when the resources to be allocated are divisible and the utilities relatively benign. It is easy to construct examples in which a CEEI does not exist when preferences are complex or the resources being allocated are not divisible. Indeed, both issues arise in practice in a variety of allocation problems, including shifts to workers, landing slots to airplanes, and our favorite, courses to students. [Varian 1974; Budish 2011] .
It was recently shown in Budish [2011] that an approximation to a CEEI solution, called A-CEEI, exists even when the resources are indivisible and agent preferences are arbitrarily complex, as required by the course allocation problems one sees in practice. The approximate solution guaranteed to exist is approximately fair (in that the agents are given almost the same budget), and approximately efficient and feasible (in that all classes are filled close to capacity, with the possible exception of very unpopular classes). This result seems to be wonderful news for the class allocation problem. However, there is a catch: Budish's proof is non-constructive as it relies on Kakutani's fixed-point theorem.
A heuristic algorithm for solving A-CEEI was introduced in Othman et al. [2010] . The algorithm is a modified search analogue to the traditional tâtonnement process, where the prices of courses that are oversubscribed are increased, and the prices of courses that are undersubscribed are decreased. This heuristic algorithm is currently used by the Wharton School (University of Pennsylvania) to assign their MBA students to courses. It has been documented that the heuristic algorithm often produces much tighter approximations than the theoretical bound; yet, on some instances it fails to find even the guaranteed approximation [Budish 2011, Section 9] .
Thus A-CEEI is a problem where practical interest motivates theoretical inquiry. We have a theorem that guarantees the existence of an approximate equilibriumthe issue is finding it. Can the heuristic of Othman et al. [2010] be replaced by a fast and rigorous algorithm for finding an approximate CEEI? Or are there complexity obstacles to approximating CEEI?
In this paper, we show that finding the guaranteed approximation to CEEI is an intractable problem: Theorem 3.1, informal statement. The problem of finding an A-CEEI as guaranteed by Budish [2011] is PPAD-complete.
We also show an essentially optimal NP-hardness result for determining whether a better approximation exists.
Theorem 4.1, informal statement. It is NP-hard to distinguish between an instance where an exact CEEI exists, and one in which there is no A-CEEI tighter than guaranteed in Budish [2011] .
THE COURSE ALLOCATION PROBLEM
Even though the A-CEEI and the existence theorem in [Budish 2011 ] are applicable to a broad range of allocation problems, we shall describe our results in the language of the course allocation problem.
We are given a set of M courses with integer capacities (the supply) (q j ) M j=1 , and a set of N students, where each student i has a set Ψ i ⊆ 2 M of permissible course bundles, with each bundle containing at most k ≤ M courses. The set Ψ i encodes both scheduling constraints (e.g., courses that meet at the same time) and any constraints specific to student i (e.g. prerequisites).
Each student i has a strict ordering over her permissible schedules, denoted by i . We allow arbitrarily complex preferences -in particular, students may regard courses as substitutes or complements. More formally:
Definition 2.1. Course Allocation Problem The input to a course allocation problem consists of: -For each student i a set of course bundles
, and The output to a course allocation problem consists of:
How is an allocation evaluated? The clearing error of a solution to the allocation problem, is the L 2 norm of the length-M vector of seats oversubscribed in any course, or undersubscribed seats in courses with positive price.
Definition 2.2. The clearing error α of an allocation is
Where z j is given by
We can now define the notion of approximate CEEI. The quality of approximation is characterized by two parameters: α, the clearing error (how far is our solution from a true competitive equilibrium?) and β, the bound on the difference in budgets (how far from equal are the budgets?). Informally, α can be thought of as the approximation loss on efficiency, and β can be thought of as the approximation loss on fairness.
(1) Each student is allocated their most preferred affordable bundle. Formally Budish [2011] it is proved that an (α, β)-approximate CEEI always exists, for some quite favorable (and as we shall see, essentially optimal) values of α and β: THEOREM 2.4. Budish [2011] For any input preferences, there exists a (α, β)-CEEI with α = kM/2 and any β > 0.
Recall that k is the maximum bundle size. α = kM/2 means that, for large number of students and course capacities, the market-clearing error converges to zero quite fast as a fraction of the endowment. It is also shown in Budish [2011] that the mechanism which allocates courses according to such an A-CEEI satisfies attractive criteria of approximate fairness, approximate truthfulness, and approximate Pareto efficiency. The reader may consult Budish [2011] for the precise definitions of the economic properties of the A-CEEI mechanism.
Total Functions and PPAD
Theorem 2.4 is an example of a non-constructive existential result; such theorems are common in mathematics, and are quite often related to economics (recall Nash's theorem, Arrow-Debreu theorem, etc.). It is often important to determine whether there is a polynomial algorithm for finding the solution guaranteed by such a theorem; computational problems of this nature are called total, because they correspond to total functions from inputs to solutions.
In exploring the difficulty of total problems, applying the methodology of NPcompleteness is problematic. The intuitive reason is that, for example, a reduction from 3SAT relies heavily on the fact that the starting 3SAT instance may be unsatisfiable. Therefore 3SAT cannot be reduced in any meaningful way to a total problem such as A-CEEI (see Chapter 2 of [Nisan et al. 2007 ] for a discussion of this point). NP-completeness does not seem to be an option. But there is an alternative: Total problems can often be proved complete for certain complexity classes between P and NP. For example, during the past decade several game-theoretic problems have been proved complete for the complexity class PPAD, containing difficult problems related to fixed-point theorems such as Brouwer's, Nash's, competitive equilibria, and so on ([Papadimitriou 1994; Abbott et al. 2005; Codenotti et al. 2006; Huang and Teng 2007; Chen and hua Teng 2009; Daskalakis et al. 2009; Kintali et al. 2009; Plvlgyi 2009; Chen and Teng 2011; Vazirani and Yannakakis 2011; Chen et al. 2013] ).
There are several interesting and subtle ways of defining PPAD, but for our purposes it is most convenient to define it as the class of all total problems that are reducible to the problem GCIRCUIT, the problem of finding the fixed point of a continuous function specified by a "generalized circuit". GCIRCUIT is defined in the next section.
A-CEEI IS PPAD-COMPLETE
THEOREM 3.1. Computing a kM 2 , β -CEEI is PPAD-complete, for some polynomially small β > 0.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of this theorem.
Membership in PPAD. We first establish that the problem belongs to the class PPAD; this proof is much harder than usual (see Appendix A). We follow the steps of the existence proof in Budish [2011] , and show that each one can be carried out either in polynomial time, or through a fixed point. One difficulty is that certain steps of Budish's proof are randomized, and we must be derandomized in polynomial time.
The problem GCIRCUIT. The reduction is from the PPAD-complete problem GCIRCUIT, alluded to in the previous section.
Generalized circuits are similar to the standard algebraic circuits, the main difference being that generalized circuits contain cycles, which allow them to verify fixed points of continuous functions. Formally, Definition 3.2 (Generalized circuits, ). A generalized circuit S is a pair (V, T ), where V is a set of nodes and T is a collection of gates. Every gate T ∈ T is a 5-tuple
1 is the type of the gate; v 1 , v 2 ∈ V ∪ {nil} are the first and second input nodes of the gate; v ∈ V is the output node.
The collection T of gates must satisfy the following important property: For every two gates
Given a generalized circuit, we are interested in the computational problem of finding an assignment that simultaneously satisfies all the constraints defined by the gates.
Definition 3.3. Given a generalized circuit S = (V, T ), we say that an assignment x : V → R -approximately satisfies S if:
and for each gate
where f G is defined as follows, depending on the type of gate G:
Given a generalized circuit S = (V, T ), -GCIRCUIT is the problem of finding an assignment that -approximately satisfies it. It is shown in to be PPAD-complete for = 1 poly(|V |) . Overview of the Reduction. We shall reduce the -GCIRCUIT problem to that of finding an (α, β)-CEEI, with approximation parameters α = Θ(N/M ) and = β/2. (Note that, by increasing N , we can make α arbitrarily large as a function of M ; in particular, α > kM/2.)
We will construct gadgets (that is, small sets of courses, students, capacities and preferences) for the various types of gates in the generalized circuit. Each gadget that we construct has one or more dedicated "input course(s)", a single "output course", and possibly some "interior courses". An output course of one gadget can (and will) be an input to another. The construction will guarantee that in any A-CEEI the price of the output course will be approximately equal to the gate applied to the prices of the input courses.
Gate gadgets. To illustrate what needs to be done, we proceed to construct a gate for the function f G¬ (x) = 1 − x; in particular, this implements a logic NOT.
LEMMA 3.4. (NOT gadget) Let n x > 4α and suppose that the economy contains the following courses:
-c x (the "input course") ; -c 1−x with capacity q 1−x = n x /2 (the "output course"); and the following set of students:
-n x students interested only in the schedule {c x , c 1−x }; and suppose further that at most n 1−x = n x /4 other students are interested in course
x + β, then none of the n x students will be able to afford the bundle {c x , c 1−x }, and therefore there will be at most n 1−x = n x /4 students enrolled in the c 1−x -much less than the capacity n x /2. Therefore z 1−x ≥ n x /4. -On the other hand, if p * 1−x < 1 − p * x , then all n x students can afford the bundle {c x , c 1−x } -therefore the class will be overbooked by n x /2; thus, z 1−x ≥ n x /2.
Similarly, we construct gadgets that simulate all the gates of the generalized circuit: LEMMA 3.5. Let n x ≥ 2 8 · α and suppose that the economy has courses c x and c y . Then for any of the gate functions f G in the definition of -GCIRCUIT, we can add: a course c z , and at most n x students interested in each of c x and c y , such that in any
In particular, p * z continue to satisfy the above inequalities in every (α, β)-CEEI even if up to n z ≤ n x /2 8 additional students (beyond the ones needed in the proof) are interested in course c z .
We defer the proof of Lemma 3.5 to the appendix.
Course-size amplification. So far, we have constructed gadgets that compute all the gates necessary for the circuit in the reduction from -GCIRCUIT. What happens when we try to concatenate them to form a circuit? Recall the last sentence in the statement of Lemma 3.5: It says that the prices continue to behave like the gate that is simulated, as long as there are not too many additional students that try to take the output course. (If there are more students, they may raise the price of the course beyond what we expect.) In particular, the number of additional students that may want the output course is smaller than the number of students that want the input course.
If we concatenated the gadgets without change, we would need to have larger class sizes as we increase the depth of the simulated circuit. This increase in class size is exponential in the depth of the circuit. Things get even worse-since we reduce from generalized circuits, our gates form cycles. If the class size must increase at every gate it would have to be infinite! To overcome this problem we construct a COPY gadget that preserves the price from the input course, but is robust to twice as many additional students: LEMMA 3.6. (Course-size amplification gadget) Let n x ≥ 100α and suppose that the economy contains the following courses:
-c x (the "input course") -for i = 1, . . . 10, c i with capacities q i = 0.5 · n x ("interior courses"); -c x with capacity q x , s.t. q x ≤ q x ≤ 4n x ("output course"); and the following sets of students:
-n x students interested in schedules ({c x , c i })
. . , {c 10 }) (in this order);
and suppose further that at most n x = 2n x other students are interested in course c x .
In particular, notice that the price of c x is guaranteed to approximate the price of c x , even in the presence of additional n x = 2n x students -twice as many students as we added to c x .
PROOF. We start by proving that all the c i 's simulate NOT gadgets simultaneously, i.e. for every i and every
None of the n x students can afford buying both c x and c i . Furthermore, for every j < i, none of the n j students will prefer c i over c j . Therefore at most n i students will take this course: z * i ≥ 0.01n x .
-If, on the other hand, p * i < 1 − p * x , then all n x students will buy course c i or some previous course c j (for j ≤ i); additionally for every j ≤ i, each of the n j corresponding students will buy some course c k for j ≤ k ≤ i. Therefore the total overbooking of classes 1, . . . , i will be at least j≤i z * j ≥ n x · (1 − 0.01i) -a contradiction to (α, β)-CEEI.
Now that we established that p
x + β, then none of the n i students, for any n i , can afford buying both c x and c i . Therefore, even in the presence of additional n x = 2n x students who want to take c x , the class will be undersubscribed by z * x ≥ q x − n x = 2n x -If p * x < x + β, then all n i students, for each i, can afford to buy their top schedule -both {c i , c x }. Therefore c x will be oversubscribed by at least z *
Finally, given an instance of -GCIRCUIT, we can use the gadgets we constructed in Lemmata 3.4-3.6 to construct an instance of (α, β)-CEEI that simulates the generalized circuit. Budish [2011] shows that his existence theorem is tight, that is, there exist economies in which it is impossible to achieve less than Ω √ kM market clearing error. One may hope that on instances encountered in practice, a better approximation may be possible, and finding it may not be prohibitively hard. We next show that even in economies that admit an exact CEEI, it is NP-hard to find even a constant factor improvement over the Ω √ kM bound.
NP HARDNESS
THEOREM 4.1. It is NP-hard to distinguish between an economy that has an exact CEEI, and an economy that does not have a Ω √ N + M , β -CEEI for any 0 ≤ β < 1.
In particular, since our reduction uses a constant k, it means that it is NP-complete to find an Ω √ kM , β -CEEI -an approximation factor smaller only by a multiplicative constant than the approximation guaranteed by the existence theorem of Budish [2011] .
Comparison to Theorem 3.1. Theorem 3.1 is in some sense stronger than Theorem 4.1 in that it applies to a larger market clearing error. In turn, Theorem 4.1 is stronger in two ways: (1) it gives NP-hardness, as opposed to PPAD-hardness; and (2) it applies to any 0 ≤ β < 1, as opposed to a polynomially small β.
Proof
We reduce from 3SAT-5, i.e., a SAT instance in which every clause contains exactly 3 variables, and each variable appears in exactly 5 clauses. Feige [1998] proved that it is NP-hard to distinguish between a satisfiable 3SAT-5 instance, and a 3SAT-5 instance where at most 1 − can be satisfied, for some > 0 2 . Given a 3SAT-5 formula, we construct a gadget for each variable and each clause. The gadgets are constructed so that for any assignment that completely satisfies the formula there exists an exact CEEI in the economy.
Furthermore, given an approximate CEEI for the economy which exactly clears the courses in a subset of the gadgets, one can recover an assignment for the 3SAT-5 formula that satisfies all the clauses corresponding to the same subset. Informally, this means that for every clause that we are unable to satisfy in the 3SAT-5 formula, there must be a deviation from exact market clearing in the gadget corresponding to either that clause, or one of its variables.
Because we use a sparse 3SAT, each deviation from market clearing can affect at most 5 clauses. Each variable gadget uses 13 courses, and each clause gadget uses only 1 more. For an instance with n clauses and 
The courses (dots) and bundles (ellipses) that interest student s T of the variable gadget. In particular, note that s T may take the courses corresponding to the assignment X = True.
The courses (dots) and bundles (ellipses) that interest student s F of the variable gadget. In particular, note that s T may take the courses corresponding to the assignment X = False.
(c) Clause gadget
The courses (dots) and bundle (shape) corresponding to the assignment (X, Y, Z) = (True, True, True), one of the seven bundles that may be picked by the clause student.
erence list:
T , {D R }; and s F has preference list:
-Soundness: It is easy to see that, in any CEEI, x i cannot be assigned more than one value: otherwise neither student will be assigned D C ; yet if D C has price zero, then both students would prefer the respective bundles that contain it. If, on the other hand, neither O j T nor O j F is assigned, we must again have a nonzero market clearing error for the courses in this gadget: -If all the inner courses have price zero, then D C will be over demanded; -If D L and D R have price zero, then under any assignment either one of the three will be over demanded, or D C will be under demanded; 
Some of the courses (dots) and bundles (shapes) of an economy simulating the formula Ψ = X ∨ ¬Y ∨ Z. From bottom to top: the bundles that interest student s T (dashed) and s F (dotted) of the variable gadget for variable X; and the bundle (solid) corresponding to the assignment (X, Y, Z) = (True, True, True), one of the seven bundles that may be picked by the clause student.
, then either D C will be over demanded, or D L will be under demanded; -Finally, since β < 1, if D C has nonzero price, then either it is under demanded, or one of the three inner courses must be over demanded. Clause gadget. For each clause containing variables {X, Y, Z}, consider seven courses: six input courses X T , X F , Y T , Y F , Z T , Z F (where each pair is the output courses of a variable gadget), and a single "budget diluting" course D. We also have a single gadget student, who is interested in any of the seven bundles corresponding to a satisfying assignment.
For example if the clause is (X ∨ ¬Y ∨ Z), the gadget student would be interested in the bundles:
In particular, the student is not interested in the bundle {X T , Y F , Z T , D}, which corresponds to assigning (X = False, Y = True, Z = False) -Soundness: Observe that the variable gadgets students are assigned courses X a , Y b , and Z c , then in any exact CEEI, the clause gadget student must be assigned the bundle {X ¬a , Y ¬b , Z ¬c , D}. -Completeness: Suppose that the variable gadgets students are assigned courses X a , Y b , and Z c , each with price at least 1 6 , while courses X ¬a , Y ¬b , and Z ¬c are all unassigned. Then if we set the price of D to be 1, the only affordable bundle for the clause gadget student is indeed {X ¬a , Y ¬b , Z ¬c , D}.
DISCUSSION
In this work we classified the computational complexity of finding an approximate CEEI as a function of the precision parameter α of the approximation, the market clearing error. We showed that finding (α, β)-CEEI is PPAD-complete when α is large enough to guarantee existence, while finding a better approximation to CEEI is NPcomplete.
One potential way around these intractability results could be to restrict the input language of preferences. This has been a fruitful line of research in combinatorial auctions [Nisan 2006; Sandholm and Boutilier 2006] . However, in contrast to that space, we do not anticipate limiting language complexity in the course allocation problem to be fruitful either in theory or in practice. Recall that the student preferences used in the PPAD-hardness proof are already very simple. Furthermore, in practice there are significant inherent complexities in students' preferences: for example, courses meeting at the same time and courses with multiple sections.
Despite the negative results shown in this paper, a heuristic search algorithm exists that finds practical solutions to A-CEEI. Interestingly, in both laboratory experiments as well as real course allocation problems, this heuristic often finds solutions that are an order of magnitude better than the theoretical 
A. A-CEEI ∈ PPAD
We show that computing a √ σM 2 , β -CEEI is in PPAD, for σ = min{2k, M }.
Remark A.1. We assume that the student preferences ( i ) are given in the form of an ordered list of all the bundles in Ψ i (i.e., all the bundles that student i prefers over the empty bundle). In particular, we assume that the total number of permissible bundles is polynomial.
Remark A.2. In fact, we prove that the following, slightly more general problem, is in PPAD: Given any β, > 0 and initial approximate-budgets vector b
Our proof will follow the steps of the existence proof by Budish [2011] . We will use the power of PPAD to solve the Kakutani problem, and derandomize the other nonconstructive ingredients.
A.1. Preliminaries
Our algorithm receives as input an economy (q j )
, parameters β, > 0, and an initial approximate-budgets vector b ∈ [1, 1 + β] N . We denoteβ = min{β, }/2.
We will consider M -dimensional price vectors in P = [0, 1 + β + ] M . In order to define a price adjustment function, we consider an enlargementP = [−1, 2 + β + ] M , as well as a truncation function t :P → P.
For each student i, we denote her demand at pricesp with budget b i by
Given the total demand of all the students, we can define the excess demand to be:
A key ingredient to the analysis is the budget-constraint hyperplanes. These are the hyperplanes in price space along which a student can exactly afford a specific bundle. For each student i and bundle x, the corresponding budget-constraint hyperplane is defined as H (i, x) = {p ∈ P :p · x = b i }.
A.2. Deterministically finding a "general position" perturbation (step 1)
It is convenient to assume that the budget-constraint hyperplanes are in "general position", i.e. there is no pointp ∈ P at which any subset of linearly dependent budgetconstraint hyperplanes intersect (in particular, no more than M hyperplanes intersect at any point). In the existence proof, this is achieved by assigning a small random reverse tax τ i,x ∈ (− , ), for each student i and bundle x; i's modified cost for bundle x at pricesp becomesp · x − τ i,x . Given taxes τ = (τ i,x ) i∈S,x∈Ψi , we redefine
In this section, we show how to deterministically choose these taxes.
LEMMA A.3. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a vector of taxes τ = (τ i,x ) i∈S,x∈Ψi such that:
for (i, x) = (i , x ) (no two perturbed prices are equal) (5) there is no pricep ∈ P at which any subset of linearly dependent budget-constraint hyperplanes intersect 4 PROOF. Assume wlog that b is rounded to the nearestβM −M : otherwise we can include this rounding in the taxes.
We proceed by induction on the pairs (i, x) of students and bundles: at each step let τ i,x be much smaller than all the taxes introduced so far 5 .
More precisely, if (i, x) is the ν th pair to be considered, then we set
where the sign is chosen such that condition 3 in the statement of the lemma is preserved. Now, assume by contradiction that there exists a k-tuple Assume further, wlog, that this is the first such k-tuple, with respect to the order of the induction. In particular, this means that x 1 , . . . , x k−1 are linearly independent. Now consider the system
Notice that it has rank k−1. We can now take k−1 linearly independent rows j 1 , . . . j k−1 such that the following system has the same unique solution α:
. . . . . .
. . .
Since X is a square matrix of full rank it is invertible, so we have that
Now, recall that
where X i,j is the (i, j)-cofactor of X. Finally, since X is a Boolean matrix, its determinant and all of its cofactors are integers of magnitude less than (k − 1) k−1 . The entries of α are therefore rational fractions with numerators and denominators of magnitude less than (k − 1) k−1 . Now, by our assumption by contradiction, k hyperplanes intersect atp:
Therefore,
However, if (i k , x k ) is the ν th pair added by the induction, then the following is an integer:
x k is not an integer, a contradiction to Equation (1).
A.3. Finding a fixed point (steps 2-4)
This subsection describes the price adjustment correspondence of [Budish 2011] , and is brought here mostly for completeness. We first define the price adjustment function:
Observe that ifp * is a fixed pointp * = f (p * ) of f , then its truncation t (p * ) = p * defines an exact competitive equilibrium 6 . Yet, we know that the economy may not have an exact equilibrium -and indeed f is discontinuous at the budget constraint hyperplanes, and so it is not guaranteed to have a fixed point.
Instead, we define an upper hemicontinuous, set-valued "convexification" of f :
F (p) = co {y : ∃ a sequence p w → p, p = p w ∈ P such that f (p w ) → y}
The correspondence F is upper hemicontinuous, non-empty, and convex; therefore, by Kakutani's fixed-point theorem it has a fixed point. Finally, by [Papadimitriou 1994 ] finding this fixed point of F is in PPAD.
define an allocation x * with bounded clearing error. We now follow step 9 of [Budish 2011 ] in order to define budgets b * such that x * is the preferred consumption by all the students at price p In this section we prove Lemma 3.5.
Lemma 3.5. Let n x ≥ 2 8 · α and suppose that the economy has courses c x and c y . Then for any of the functions f listed below, we can add: a course c z , and at most n x students interested in each of c x and c y , such that in any (α, β)-CEEI p * z ∈ f p * x , p * y − 2β, f p * x , p * y + 2β
(1) HALF: f G /2 (x) = x/2 (2) VALUE: f In particular, p * z ∈ f p * x , p * y − 2β, f p * x , p * y + 2β in every (α, β)-CEEI even if up to n z ≤ n x /2 8 additional students (beyond the ones specified in the proofs below) are interested in course c z .
Notice, that like in similar gadget reductions from PPAD-complete problems, LESS, AND, and OR are brittle comparators (see discussion in Daskalakis et al. [2009] for more details).
PROOF.
(1) HALF:
Let c z have capacity q z = n x /8, let n z = q z /2, and consider three auxiliary courses c 1 , c 2 , and c x of capacities q 1 = q 2 = q z and q x = n x /2. Using lemma 3.4 add n x students that will guarantee p x ∈ [1 − p * x , 1 − p * x + β]. Additionally, consider n x = n x /4 students with preference list: ({c z , c 1 , c x } , {c z , c 2 , c x } , {c 1 , c 2 , c x }) (in this order), then: -If the total price p * i + p * j of any pair i, j ∈ {1, 2, z} is less than p * x − β, then all n x students will be able to afford some subset in their preference list, leaving a total overbooking of at least z
